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Implied License Doctrine and News Aggregators
In the 1918 Supreme Court case that gave rise to the common law doctrine
of "hot news" misappropriation, the Associated Press (AP) famously sued the
International News Service (INS), a competing newswire, for copying factual
content from AP news stories without crediting the AP.' Nearly a century has
passed, and the AP is going after a news collection service again. In February
2012, the AP filed suit against Meltwater News, an online "news aggregator,"
for copyright infringement and "hot news" misappropriation.' On their face,
the two cases present nearly identical issues, down to the same plaintiff. But
times have changed-and so should the law.
The current suit is only the latest in a rash of recent copyright and hot news
litigation' aimed at combatting news aggregators, or websites and mobile
applications that digitally copy headlines and short excerpts of news stories
from various Internet sources and display them all in one place.4 In light of the
1. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). News disseminators enjoy a quasi-
property right in news facts (commonly referred to as "hot news"), "until [their]
commercial value as news ... has passed away." Id. at 245. The "hot news" doctrine provides
a tort action vindicating this right. See MARK A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRIssA
C. BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW 380-82. (8th ed. 2011).
2. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 12 Civ. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012).
3. See, e.g., Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Associated Press v. All Headline News
Corp., No. o8 Civ. 00323 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 20o8); Amended Complaint, Agence France
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-oo546 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2005).
4. The term "news aggregator" is a flexible one, sometimes used interchangeably with "news
reader" or "feed reader." See Fiona Powell, Blog Tips: A Glossary of Blog Terms,
BUSINESSBLOGSCHOOL (Oct. 15, 2oog), http://businessblogschool.com/i3/business-blogging
/blog-tips-a-glossary-of-blog-terms. I focus here on what Kimberley Isbell has called "feed
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many economic challenges facing traditional news media today,s commentators
have been swift to blame news aggregators for free riding off newspapers' and
magazines' expensively produced content. Because intellectual property law
does not grant copyright protection in news itself," academics and government
actors have sought new solutions to the news aggregator problem. In 2009, for
instance, Judge Richard Posner suggested amending the Copyright Act so that
news aggregators could be held liable for infringement.! Media law practitioners,
meanwhile, have called for the federalization of hot news misappropriation
through legislation.9 The Federal Trade Commission even held a policy
roundtable in 2010 that considered several different solutions to the aggregator
problem, including compulsory licensing and statutory limits to fair use.o
aggregators," which generally display headlines and article excerpts, typically with a link to
the original website. Kimberley Isbell, The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications and
Best Practices 5 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, Research Publication No. 2010-10, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=167o339. Examples of feed aggregator websites include Yahoo!
News, Google News, and Newser. Mobile feed aggregators that display news excerpts in a
format compatible with mobile phones or tablets include Flipboard, News36o, and Pulse.
s. See, e.g., Ken Doctor, The Newsonomics of the Next Recession, NIEMAN JOURNALIsM LAB (Aug.
11, 2011, 10:oo AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2011/o8/the-newsonomics-of-the-next
-recession.
6. See, e.g., Bill Keller, All the Aggregation That's Fit To Aggregate, N.Y. TIES MAG. (Mar. 1o,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi1/03/13/magazine/mag-13lede-t.html; Yelena Schuster,
AP Chairman: 'We Can No Longer Stand By and Watch Others Walk Offtwith Our Work,' N.Y.
MAG. (Apr. 6, 2009, 6:02 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/inteV2009/o4/we-canno-longer
stand by and.html.
7. See infra Part I; see also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 83 (2008)
(explaining that early copyright law did not apply to newspapers at all).
8. Richard Posner, The Future of Nevspapers, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 23, 2009),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2oo9/o6/the-future-of-newspapers--posner.html.
9. See, e.g., Andrew L. Deutsch, Protecting News in the Digital Era: The Case for a Federalized Hot
News Misappropriation Tort, 1003 PRAC. L. INST. 511 (2010); David Marburger & Daniel
Marburger, Reviving the Economic Viability ofNewspapers and Other Originators ofDaily News
Content 46 (2009), http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Articles
/MainAnalysis.pdf. John C. McDonnell, meanwhile, has made a thoughtful argument that
the current state-level hot news doctrine may be adequate to protect newsgatherers'
proprietary interests in the aggregator era. See John C. McDonnell, The Continuing Viability
of the Hot News Misappropriation Doctrine in the Age of Internet News Aggregation, 1o Nw. J.
TECH, & INTELL. PROP. 255 (2012). McDonnell admits, however, that "the hot news
misappropriation doctrine is not the perfect tool for content producers to use against news
aggregators." Id. at 275. Rather, he sees it as a preferred option to "currently available
alternatives." Id. Notably, McDonell's discussion of alternative proposals does not contain
any mention of implied license doctrine. Id. at 271-73.
1o. Potential Policy Recommendations To Support the Reinvention offournalism, FED. TRADE COMM'N
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All of these conversations are fundamentally misguided because they
attempt to address the problem of online news aggregation as if it were a
traditional hot news or copyright issue. The similarity of the current
aggregator problem to the paradigmatic hot news case is actually a red herring.
As it turns out, the Meltwater case has less in common with INS v. AP-or, for
that matter, with traditional copyright infringement cases -and more to do
with recent case law governing the operation of online search engines.
This Comment argues that the appropriate legal framework for addressing
news aggregators lies in federal courts' handling of intellectual property claims
against search engines. In the 20o6 case of Field v. Google, Inc.," a federal
district court applied a new version of the doctrine of implied license to hold
that Google's indexing of websites does not amount to copyright infringement
when a website owner has not affirmatively opted out of indexing through
technological measures." This Comment argues that extending the Field
decision to news aggregators would establish a legal framework that is more
appropriate to the technological reality of the modern news industry and could
also prove mutually beneficial. Thus far, implied license doctrine online has
been characterized primarily as benefitting would-be infringers." Indeed,
(2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/juni/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf.
-. 412 F. Supp. 2d n1o6 (D. Nev. 2oo6).
12. Id. at 1115-16.
13. See, e.g., Jonathan Bailey, Does Posting Your Work Online Give Others the Right To Copy?,
PLAGIARISM TODAY (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.plagiarismtoday.con/201o/o8/19/does
-posting-your-work-online-give-others-the-right-to-copy ("[W]e are faced with the
possibility ... that courts could rule that posting a work on the Web is the same as giving an
implied license to copy and republish it freely, something that could all but eliminate
copyright protection for many Web publishers."); Jeff Neuberger, The Righthaven Lawsuits:
What Is Fair Use of Online Publications?, PROSKAUER NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG
(Feb. 24, 2011), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2on/o2/24/the-righthaven-lawsuits-what-is
-fair-use-of-online-publications (calling recent media law implied license decisions
"concerning" insofar as they suggest copyright owners are "consenting to the unrestricted
copying and dissemination of the work by third parties"). Indeed, policymakers in pursuit
of copyright-friendly reforms have rejected implied license doctrine precisely because it
seems to benefit aggregators. The FTC's 2010 roundtable on aggregation, for instance,
characterizes the Field decision as a barrier to proposed statutory limits on fair use, because
an implied license seems to give aggregators more freedom to copy content. See Potential
Policy Recommendations To Support the Reinvention of Journalism, supra note io, at ii
("[S]ome could argue that . . . some aggregators . . . have implicit permission from
newspaper web site owners to copy and distribute content, which may negate the need for a
fair use defense."). Although the FTC was clearly aware of the Field decision and considered
it in its brainstorm for solutions to the news aggregator problem, it did not view implied
license doctrine as a potential solution benefiting the news media at all.
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aggregators themselves have relied on implied licenses as defenses against
infringement in recent litigation. 4 But this Comment is the first to recognize
that implied license doctrine can actually benefit content originators too, by
giving legal force to a nearly costless technological solution: so-called robots
exclusion protocols, or lines of code written into websites that would tell
aggregators to stay away.
In Part I below, I expand on the news aggregator problem and briefly
consider commonly proposed solutions. Part II describes the emerging
standard of opt-out schemes for gaining copyright holders' permissions online
and examines how the Field decision enforces this standard as a matter of law.
Finally, in Part III, I explain how extending implied license doctrine to news
aggregators can benefit both aggregators and newspapers. Specifically, I argue
that courts should clarify that aggregators expose themselves to copyright
liability when they ignore robots exclusion protocols. This simple doctrinal fix
would restore some degree of informal protection to the news by making it
more difficult and costly for aggregators to copy original content without
permission. It would also provide newspapers with a bargaining chip they can
use to channel negotiations with news aggregators toward mutually beneficial
licensing deals.
I. THE NEWS AGGREGATOR PROBLEM
Although there are many causes underlying the current economic crisis in
the news industry, media insiders partly blame news aggregators, which copy
headlines and excerpts from news stories from various websites and display
them in a single forum, often without the advertisements that originally
accompanied the stories. News aggregators, the argument runs, "free ride" off
content in which traditional news institutions have invested costly time and
effort. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch, founder of News Corporation, has even
gone so far as to call news aggregation "theft."i
In reality, the news media's relationship with aggregators is a complicated one
14. Notably, such arguments have been advanced in both American and foreign courts. See, e.g.,
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Klerks, No. 2:10-cV-o0741, 2010 WL 3724897, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Sept.
17, 2010); Google, Inc.'s Answer and Counterclaims at 28-29, Agence France Presse v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-00546 (D.D.C. May 19, 2005); Cours d'Appel [CA] [Courts of
Appeal] Bruxelles, 9e ch. Nov. 5, 2011, 37 (Belg.), http://www.scribd.con/doc/6o314492
/Copiepresse-Ruling-Appeal-Google-5May20ll.
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because, even when aggregators copy portions of news stories without permission,
they may actually be helping newspapers distribute their stories to new
audiences." In fact, there appears to be no direct empirical evidence that news
aggregators are actively cutting into the news industry's advertising revenue.
Yet this is not to say that the traditional media's concerns about potential
losses to news aggregators are unwarranted. More than ever, newspapers feel the
need to be protective of their ad revenue, which plummeted forty-five percent in
the first decade of the 2ooos." By presenting original content stripped of ads,
aggregators threaten to deprive content originators not only of website traffic,
but also of precious advertising income. And if that income continues to spiral
downward, one may reasonably fear that news stories that are costly to
produce-such as investigative reports -will cease to emerge in the first place.'
What makes news aggregators particularly threatening from a news
originator's perspective is that, despite the intuition that news aggregators are
guilty of free riding, their activities frequently lie beyond the reach of copyright
liability. This is so for two reasons: copyright protection in news is thin, and
aggregators' taking of content often falls within the fair use defense. Because facts
alone are not copyrightable, copyright protection in news stories only extends to
the elements of the story -like wording and organization - that are original to the
author.' 9 Moreover, even longer excerpts of news articles displayed by aggregators
are typically protected by the fair use defense, particularly because section 107 of
the Copyright Act specifically lists "news reporting" as one of the purposes of use
16. Cf Lesley Chiou & Catherine E. Tucker, News, Copyright, and Online Aggregators 4 (Oct.
1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://arrow.hunter.cuny.edu/media-economics-workshop
/conference-papers/chiou%2oand%20tucker%2onews.pdf (reporting an empirical study
finding that "news aggregators actually provoke readers to seek further news").
17. Potential Policy Recommendations To Support the Reinvention of Journalism, supra note lo, at 2
(citing State of the News Media 2010, PEW REs. CENTER (Mar. 15, 2010), http://
www.pewresearch.org/pubs/523/state-of-the-news-media-2010). It is unknown what
portion of this decrease can be attributed to the activities of news aggregators, as the
decrease in ad revenue can also be attributed to a variety of other sources as well-for
example, losses in classified advertising spurred by the development of websites such as
Craigslist.
18. For examples of just how costly journalism can be, see Zachary M. Seward, An Extremely
Expensive Cover Story-With a New Way of Footing the Bill, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (Aug.
28, 2009), http://www.niemanlab.org/2oo9/o8/an-extremely-expensive-cover-story-with
-a-new-way-of-footing-the-bill. According to Seward, a single 13,ooo-word New York Times
Magazine article investigating the euthanization of patients in a New Orleans hospital after
Hurricane Katrina cost $400,000 to produce.
19. 17 U.S.C. 5 102(a) (2006) (clarifying that copyright protection extends to "original works of
authorship"); see Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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that are privileged in fair use analysis.2 o This means that aggregators can
convincingly claim that, by copying publications' stories, they are merely re-
reporting the news and disseminating it to a broader audience.
Until recently, in the absence of clear copyright protection for news,
newspapers and other original content providers were able to rely on the
protection of "tedium" to prevent free riding on their expensively produced
content. That is to say, third parties would not copy extensively from news outlets
when copying and distribution technologies were too cumbersome to make free
riding worth it. The trouble with today's news aggregators is that digital
technology enables them to instantaneously copy and distribute news content to
21thousands of users on their laptops, tablet devices, and mobile phones.
So the question arises: How should intellectual property law stop news
aggregators from free riding on publications' content? The prevailing answers
to date have fallen into one of two camps: either amend the Copyright Act to
expand copyright protection in news, or rely on hot news misappropriation
liability. The first option is problematic from a constitutional perspective. The
Supreme Court has declined to subject copyright legislation to elevated First
Amendment scrutiny where "Congress has not altered the traditional contours
of copyright protection."' Yet the Court recently clarified in Golan v. Holder
that these "traditional contours" include the idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use" -the very same First Amendment safeguards that aggregation control
legislation would threaten. For this reason, such legislation may in fact be
subject to strict scrutiny.' The second option, meanwhile, is likely unworkable
from a practical perspective because hot news protection only gives content
originators an exclusive right in the facts that they report for a limited time -as
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
21. See, for example, Copyright & Commerce: Guarantees or Promises?, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE
CENTER 37:56 (May 9, 2011), http://beyondthebookcast.com/copyright-and-commerce-o5
-09-11, in which Tim Jucovy, associate counsel at the Washington Post, explains that "tedium
was a great protection against copyright infringement .... Now all of the sudden, you have
the reproduction but you also have just the incredible ease of mass scale distribution . . .
22. Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
23. Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 890 (2012).
24. This is not to say that amending the Copyright Act is impossible- merely that any
amendment would have to be sufficiently narrowly tailored to not place an undue burden on
aggregator speech. See generally Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of
Legislation Treating News Aggregation as Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
947 (2010) (considering Judge Posner's proposed copyright amendment and concluding
that it would have to be very circumscribed to pass constitutional muster).
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long as they retain their commercial value as hot news.2 s At the time of INS v.
AP, the question of how long a news service could retain its "quasi-property"
right in facts was an easy one to answer: generally speaking, as long as it took
the newspaper to distribute its stories over the geographic reach of its
circulation. In the Internet era, when distribution happens instantly and
internationally, one might argue that a publication's exclusive right to the facts
in an article is extinguished as soon as the work is posted online.
More importantly, each of the proposed solutions is stuck in an outdated
mindset about the operation of intellectual property rights on the Internet. To
solve the news aggregation problem, the legal community should look not to
the hot news and copyright cases of old, but to the new framework of
intellectual property law that is developing in other Internet contexts.
II. OPT-OUT PERMISSIONS AND IMPLIED LICENSES
Traditional copyright law is an opt-in system, in which the default
distribution of rights prohibits reproduction of copyrighted material unless
copyright holders affirmatively give their permission.26 This system, however,
has been shaped in large part by technological considerations. Before the
Internet, it was usually easier for a copyright holder to give permission on an
individual basis than to search for would-be infringers in order to revoke
permission. Now that the Internet has greatly reduced search costs, the
technological norm has changed to an opt-out system. Any solution to the
news aggregator problem, whether legal or technological, will need to operate
based on opt-out principles as well.
A. The Emerging Opt-Out Norm Online
The Internet has been designed from its inception to be an open system.
When the Internet Protocol (IP) was first developed in the 196os and 1970s, its
creators designed it to be an "open architecture" network, one which all were
permitted to join. 7 Users now browse websites freely by default, unless site
owners exclude them by taking affirmative steps to block access, such as
as. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 1o6 (20o6) ("The owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights ...
to authorize" enumerated uses of a copyrighted work.).
27. JACK GOLDSMiTH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD 23 (2006).
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requiring a user account and password or blocking a specific IP address. The
result is an opt-out system enforced by technology; all are free to join, unless
owners use technology to opt out of the open community.
Most news aggregators also operate on an opt-out basis -this one enforced
by a combination of technology and community norms. The technology
underlying "feed aggregators" is the same technology used by search engines
like Google, which index billions of web pages by using a computer code,
called a "web crawler," to digitally scan and copy them. Google's "Googlebot"
crawler does not seek permission from website owners to index their sites;
instead, it will automatically index a site unless its owner takes affirmative
steps to stop the Googlebot.2 9
The easiest way for a website owner to do this is to simply put instructions in
the site's code telling the Googlebot to stay away. A site owner can create a text
file called "robots.txt" -hidden from viewers, but immediately visible to the web
crawler -that instructs search engines on which parts of a site they may index.3o
Authors of robot.txt files can be quite specific about what content they do and do
not want indexed. For instance, a blog author may wish to make the text of her
posts open to the Googlebot while keeping personal photographs off-limits. This
customizability is perhaps the greatest advantage of the opt-out default: if the
Googlebot were forced to ask permission to index every folder, transaction costs
would be prohibitively high.?
Notably, robots.txt does not make it technologically impossible for a web
crawler to index a site. All it does is notify the robot of the site owner's wishes.
Thus, the robots exclusion protocol is currently enforced only by web crawlers'
voluntary compliance with the community norm of respecting these instructions.
B. Implied License Doctrine
Aside from both relying on web crawler technology, search engines and
news aggregators are similar in another important respect: both create copies
of websites that potentially infringe their owner's copyrights. When a web
28. See John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License To Inject Common Sense into Digital Copyright,
85 N.C. L.REV. 885, 890 (2007).
29. See Googlebot, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer
=182072 (last updated Sept. 24, 2012).
3o. About /robots.txt, ROBOTSTXT.oRG, http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html (last updated
Aug. 23, 2010).
31. See Michael R. Mattioli, Note, Opting Out: Procedural Fair Use, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22
(2007) ("For practical purposes, strict opt-in would be the death of online search.").
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crawler indexes a site, it creates a copy of all of the site's contents. Because the
right to copy or reproduce a work is one of the exclusive rights of copyright
owners, it seems that under traditional copyright law, web crawlers would
automatically be guilty of copyright infringement." Yet courts have so far been
willing to permit search engines' indexing. One decision in particular provides
a model for how the law should approach the news aggregator problem.
In Field v. Google, Inc., a federal district court in Nevada used a new version
of the doctrine of implied license in copyright law to hold that Google's use of
the Googlebot to index websites does not amount to copyright infringement
when a website owner has not opted out of indexing." Under traditional
copyright law, holding a license is an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement. The license can either be granted expressly or
impliedly. 4 Historically, implied licenses have only been found in copyright
cases when there is direct dealing between just a few parties."
The Field court expanded the earlier doctrine to hold that implied license
arises "where the copyright holder knows of the use and encourages it.""
Applying this two-pronged knowledge and encouragement test to the Field
facts, the court found that the website owner was aware of the robots exclusion
protocol mechanisms for communicating with the Googlebot, and that by not
using them, he essentially encouraged the Googlebot to index his content.
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 1o6 (20o6). Notably, when an aggregator does not fall within the realm of
fair use, it can be liable for not only copying a work, as search engines are, but also for
publicly displaying the work. Aggregators that compile a variety of news sources could also
be said to be creating "derivative works." All of these uses are traditionally exclusive to
copyright holders. Id. The fact that search engines' activities could be infringing copyrights
on the basis of copying alone, however, makes the comparison between search engines and
aggregators nonetheless apt.
33. 412 F. Supp. 2d iio6, 1115-16 (D. Nev. 20o6).
34. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 ( 9 th Cir. 1990) ("[A] nonexclusive
license may be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct." (quoting 3 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER&DAVID NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § lo.03[A], at 10-36 (1989))).
S. See, for example, id. at 558-59, in which the Ninth Circuit found that a film producer had an
implied license to use a special effects company's copyrighted footage, where the producer
had paid the company nearly $56,000 for the footage. The court reasoned that although the
parties did not discuss the copyright, "[t]o hold that [the plaintiff] did not . . . convey a
license to use the footage in [the producer's film] would mean that plaintiffs contribution
to the film was 'of minimal value,' a conclusion that can't be squared" with the footage's
hefty price tag. Id.
36. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
37. Id. ("Thus, with knowledge of how Google would use the copyrighted works he placed on
those pages, and with knowledge that he could prevent such use, Field instead made a
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The Field court thus recast the passive failure to use robots.txt as an active behavior
that gives rise to an implied license. Under Field, where a website owner knows
that the Googlebot is accessing his copyrighted works, and where he "encourages"
the copying by leaving his site open, the Googlebot's copying is permitted.
C. The Potential for Extending Field's Reach
The Field decision represented a novel and unusually broad application of
implied license doctrine designed to respond to the technological reality of opt-
out mechanisms on the Internet. Its two-pronged test has begun to take hold
in other jurisdictions, so that implied license is now emerging as an established
mechanism for dealing with the allocation of intellectual property rights
online." Indeed, some commentators have predicted that implied licensing
will-and should-become central to the allocation of intellectual property
rights on the Internet. 9
Admittedly, an opt-out scheme for gaining copyright holders' permission
online represents a significant departure from the traditional framework of
American copyright law, which places the burden on would-be infringers to
seek affirmative permission. For this reason, some courts have been hesitant to
extend Field's reach beyond the narrow search engine context. For instance, in
a dispute between Google Books, a searchable online database of books, and
The Authors Guild, a federal court recently rejected a proposed settlement that
would have used an opt-out system. 4o The court found that it would be
"incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the onus on
copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when Google copied
their works without first seeking their permission."4 4
Yet placing affirmative duties on authors is not entirely new to American
copyright law.42 While the present version of the Copyright Act has mostly
conscious decision to permit it.").
38. See, e.g., Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-2757, 20o8 WL 4410095 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 20o8)
(applying the Field test to find that plaintiffs posting of copyrighted works online amounted
to an implied license); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 20o6) (holding
that Google's archiving of a writer's postings of copyrighted material was not infringing).
Google has also used implied license as a defense in the ongoing Google Books litigation. See
Mattioli, supra note 31, at 2-10.
39. See Sieman, supra note 28, at 916-24.
40. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 77o F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
41. Id. at 682.
42. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 31, at 19.
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done away with registration formalities, 43 historically such requirements often
burdened copyright holders. Registration with the U.S. Copyright Office' and
deposit of copyrighted works with the Library of Congress"5 are still
prerequisites for bringing infringement suits., 6 Indeed, the "onus on copyright
holders" to opt out online is hardly an onus at all; it merely requires the use of
a robots exclusion protocol, which is easy and almost costless to implement.
Moreover, although applying Field's expansive view of implied licenses to the
news aggregator context would represent a significant judicial innovation, doing
so would be entirely consistent with already developing community norms on
the Internet, as recent litigation surrounding aggregators reveals. To provide just
one example, when French news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP) sued
Google News in 2005, Google answered with a counterclaim seeking declaratory
judgment that its uses were authorized by implied license.47 Google stated that it
"follows widely publicized and known Internet standards, including standards
allowing third party websites to 'opt out' of Google News."*4 Because AFP
apparently knew of the opt-out technology and did not employ it, Google argued
that its use of AFP content was licensed, "implicitly if not explicitly."49 The AFP
litigation settled out of court,o so it is unknown whether Google's argument
would have succeeded. It is telling, however, that Google based its counterclaims
on the "known Internet standards" of online opt-out culture.
III. A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL SOLUTION: WHAT IMPLIED LICENSE
DOCTRINE CAN DO FOR THE NEWS INDUSTRY
Although others have extolled the benefits of relying on implied license
43. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 415 (5th ed. 2010).
44. 17 U.S.C. 5 408 (2006).
45. Id. § 407.
46. Id. 5 411 (stating that except for actions vindicating visual artists' moral rights under 17
U.S.C. 5 io6A,"no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall
be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this
title").
47. Google, Inc.'s Answer and Counterclaims at 28-29, Agence France Presse v. Google, Inc.,
No. 1:05-cv-oo546 (D.D.C. May 19, 2005).
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id. at 28.
5o. See Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse, Google Settle Copyright Dispute, CNET NEWS
(Apr. 6, 2007), http://news.cnet.coM/2100-103o3-6174008.html.
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doctrine online generally,s' commentators have thus far not recognized the
benefits to the news industry that could emerge if courts were to clarify that
violating the terms of an implied license can expose news aggregators to
liability. While aggregators may seem to be the clear beneficiaries of implied
license doctrine, consistent application of the doctrine would make robots
exclusion protocols legally enforceable-which, in turn, could restore some
degree of tedium protection in news and help to channel negotiations between
newspapers and aggregators toward mutually beneficial licensing agreements.
As explained above, the primary means to stop the grant of an implied
license-the robots exclusion protocol-is currently enforced only by
community norms, as it has no technological exclusionary ability and no real
legal teeth outside of the search engine context contemplated in Field. It is
unclear whether the instructions of a robots exclusion protocol can be
considered a legally enforceable contract." Moreover, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), which prohibits circumvention of technological
measures53 controlling access to copyrighted works, 4 is unlikely to provide an
avenue for legal enforcement of robots.txt because robots.txt probably does not
satisfy the DMCA's definition of digital rights management." One legal
solution to the news aggregator problem, then, is for courts to clarify that
ignoring a robots.txt file is a violation of the terms of the implied license, which
in turn re-exposes the offending news aggregator to copyright liability. This
simple doctrinal clarification would encourage compliance on the part of
aggregators. It would also encourage traditional news media to more widely
adopt the use of robots exclusion protocols, whereas currently they often do
S1. See, e.g., Sieman, supra note 28.
s5. See id. at 909 ("Whether this notice to Google has any legal force at all is extremely unclear
and not previously litigated.").
53. These sorts of "technological measures" are commonly referred to as "digital rights
management" (DRM). A classic example of DRM is technology that prevents a CD or DVD
from being copied. See Digital Rights Management, WIKPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Digital-rights-management (last updated Sept. 6, 2012).
54. 17 U.S.C. 5 1201(a)(1)(A) (20o6).
ss. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B) ("[A] technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if the
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the
work."); see Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp.
2d 627, 642 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("No court has found that a robots.txt file universally
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not perceive a benefit to using them.s' Combined, these two effects would
restore some degree of tedium protection in news, as widespread use of
robots.txt would make it impossible for aggregators' web crawlers to rapidly
copy large swaths of content from around the Internet.
Naturally, news sites may not always wish to block news aggregators from
their sites, as aggregators have the potential to have symbiotic rather than
antagonistic relationships with news providers. Perhaps the greatest benefit of
this scheme for enforcing robots exclusion protocols, then, is that it will enable
news providers to use robots.txt as a bargaining chip to channel negotiations
with aggregators toward affirmative licensing deals. If robots exclusion
protocols become legally enforceable, then a news site can present an
aggregator with two alternatives: either the site will block them out entirely by
using a robots.txt file, or the aggregator can sign an affirmative licensing deal
with the site, which will then permit it to pay the site for the right to aggregate
its content. Such deals can benefit newspapers and aggregators alike-as is
suggested by the fact that the settlement in the AFP case granted Google a
license to link to AFP's content (presumably in exchange for a fee, although the
financial terms of the settlement were not disclosed)."
CONCLUSION
Extending implied license doctrine to the news aggregator context may
ultimately represent a win for aggregators and news providers alike. On the
one hand, an implied license enables aggregators to disseminate information
broadly without fearing potential liability at every turn. On the other hand,
judicial enforcement of robots exclusion protocols can provide content
originators with a sense of security that their desires to opt out of copyright
permissions will be respected. What is more, news sites can rely on the promise
of compliance with robots.txt to channel negotiations toward traditional
licensing deals with aggregators.
Best of all, the opt-out framework envisioned in Field v. Google reflects the
technological reality of the news aggregator problem. The Internet was
designed to be a presumptively open sphere for the exchange of ideas and
culture. By enabling the rapid dissemination of news to broad audiences-
while leaving in place incentives for monetary licensing deals that will fund
56. Telephone Interview with Timothy L. Jucovy, Assoc. Counsel, The Wash. Post (Dec. 9,
2011).
57. McCarthy, supra note 50.
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costly journalism- implied licensing fits into this ethos. Courts should
embrace the opportunity to develop a new line of copyright doctrine that
responds to, rather than struggles to overcome, the technological landscape of
the modern news industry.
MONIKA ISIA JASIEWICZ
* I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Jack Balkin for advising the project from which this
Comment stems. I am also grateful to the staff of The Yale Law journal, and especially Dave
Keenan, for their extraordinarily thoughtful editing. Special thanks to the legal department
at the Washington Post, particularly Tim Jucovy, for providing inspiration and insight -not
to mention their constant and unfailing support. Finally, to my parents, whom I can never
repay for their love and encouragement.
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